

IMUFUZZER: Resilience-based Discovery of Signal Injection Attacks on Robotic Aerial Vehicles

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Tyler Summers*, Hongjun Choi[¶], Heejo Lee[‡], Chung Hwan Kim*

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


MEMS IMU Sensors

- **IMU Sensors** – Accelerometers and Gyroscopes.


Sensor	Measures
Accelerometer	Speed/Acceleration
Gyroscope	Roll, Pitch & Yaw

- **MEMS Sensors** – Micro-electro-mechanical systems.




Signal Injection Attacks

- Sensor spoofing with acoustic signals [USENIX Sec'15, EuroS&P'17, USENIX Sec.'18].




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


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
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Attack Setup






Attack Setup



Do The Same Attacks Work In All Cases?



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No. Same Attacks $\neq$ Same Impacts.



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
Change in **physical states** triggers crash!

IMUFUZZER's Approach

- We present ***IMUFUZZER***:

IMUFUZZER's Approach


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
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
- Explore **physical states** to find **hidden attacks**.




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


- **Control-aware feedback** for efficient sensor fuzzing.



Inputs To Fuzzer


Inputs To Fuzzer



Sensor Profile


Derived from real-world
IMU sensors

Inputs To Fuzzer



Sensor Profile

Derived from real-world
IMU sensors



Seed Mission

1. Waypoints
2. Distances
3. Angles

Sensor Input Generator


- Injects sine waves with varying **amplitude & frequency**.

$$A * \sin(2\pi Ft + \phi)$$

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Mission Mutation

- Generates diverse 3D mission paths.

Dist. = [0,30]m.


XY-Ang.= [0,360]°

Z-Ang.= [-90,+90]°

**Mission
Mutator**


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


Mission Mutation



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


Mission Failure Detection







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
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


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
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Mission Success $\neq$ Stable Flight

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


Mission Success $\neq$ Stable Flight



Code Coverage $\neq$ More Attacks

What Feedback Metric Should We Use?



Mission Success $\neq$ Stable Flight



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Feedback Metric: Resilience Score

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- Quantifies RAV **stability and performance**.
- Having **lower $\rho \rightarrow$ weaker RAV resilience** (system destabilized).

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Computed by monitoring **internal controller states**:

1. Acceleration
2. Angular Velocity
3. Position

Evaluation

- ArduCopter v4.5.0 
- Physical drone experiments with Pixhawk4 board.



Sensor Profiles Used by IMUFuzzer

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6 real-world IMU sensor profiles

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6 real-world IMU sensor profiles

Find a **valid range** of displacements for each IMU under test.

	Sensor	Amp. (V)	Freq. (KHz)	Displacement	
				Min	Max
Accel.	AXDL345	10.3	3.8	-134.0	53.2
	MPU-6050	9.5	5.3	-80.0	80.0
	MPU-9250	4.2	20.6	-22.2	-4.3
Gyro.	L3G4200D	8	8.1	-105.1	105.3
	MPU-6050	3.2	26.86	-270.4	260.3
	MPU-9250	3.2	27.3	-232.6	247.1

Attacks Discovered

23 unique attacks across accelerometers and gyroscopes

- Each case had:
 - distinct **flight path**.
 - distinct **acoustic signal**.
- *19 cases* resulted in the RAV *crashing*.
- *4 cases* made the RAV suffer significant *deviation*.

Statefulness of Attacks

#	Attk. ID	Signal Injection		
		Amp.	Freq. (kHz)	Sensor Profile
1	A1	19.75-29.75	20	AXDL345
2	A2	19.25-29.50	16	AXDL345
3	A3	9.25-11.00	40	MPU-6050
4	A4	13.25-19.25	28	MPU-6050
5	A5	18.5-23.50	11.2	MPU-6050
6	A6	20.25-28.25	16	AXDL345
7	A7	10.00-26.75	40	MPU-6050
8	A8	17.50-19.50	24	MPU-6050
9	A9	4.25-8.50	52	AXDL345
10	A10	15.00-22.50	28	AXDL345
11	A11	2.75-8.00	44	AXDL345
12	A12	14.00-29.50	47.2	AXDL345
13	G1	13.50-30.00	35.4	MPU-6050
14	G2	7.25-30.00	48	L3G4200D
15	G3	9.00-29.00	48	MPU-6050
16	G4	7.25-30.00	40	L3G4200D
17	G5	20.25-29.75	23.8	L3G4200D
18	G6	11.00-17.00	6.4	MPU-9250
19	G7	27.25-29.75	15.8	MPU-9250
20	G8	22.50-28.75	47.8	MPU-6050
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



Only **7 attacks** worked in **all flight scenarios**.

Other **16 attacks** required **specific physical states**.

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
Real-world Experiments

- Physical Experiments:
 - Pixhawk4 drone with Ardupilot v4.5.
 - Mission with varied physical states.
- Inject signal at **27.4 kHz** into an **ICM-20689 gyroscope**.



Effectiveness of Resilience Feedback


- Fuzzing with and without resilience score feedback.



Effectiveness of Resilience Feedback

- Fuzzing with and without resilience score feedback.

2.2x additional mission failures than randomized selection



IMUFUZZER Summary

- **Sensor fuzzing** framework to find acoustic injection attacks.
- **Acoustic signals + mission mutation + resilience feedback** for effective exploration.
- **23 unique attacks** with **6 real-world IMU profiles**.
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Join us at the poster session!

Q&A

Contact: **Sudharssan Mohan**
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